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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The phrase "vested rights" is a property term, and, when used in
connection with one's right to a remedy, is inaccurate, because in this
sense, it means those interests which the state must recognize and protect,
and which cannot be taken from the individual arbitrarily.
It is undisputed that the Federal Constitution gives the person a right
to a remedy and adequate mode of procedure. This, like any other right,
may be impaired or taken away in situations where some social interest
becomes paramount to the individual right. But, unless some sufficient
social interest is shown, the legislature has no power to impair or deprive
a person of these rights, and in case the legislature insists on so doing,
its effort would be unconstitutional under the due process or equal pro-
tection clauses of the Federal Constitution. This doctrine was pronounced
in Truax v. Corrigan,6 where a statute that deprived the appellant of the
right to an injunction in cases of strikes and boycotts by employees was
held unconstitutional.
Since the use of the phrase "vested rights" in connection with the
present subject, is in itself an anomalous usage, and the cases promul-
gating the doctrine of no vested right in a remedy or mode of procedure
recognize some sort of a right to some remedy, the rationale along this line
seems to be a bit arbitrary. Even if we admit that a person has a vested
right in a thing, it would still be capable of being impaired or changed if
the legislature could find some social interest, in favor of the impairment
or change, which would be sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court of the
United States that the due process clause had been satisfied. It is a
treadmill of reasoning to justify the changing of a remedy or mode of
procedure by the doctrine of no vested right in such remedy when the
same change could be made even though there was a vested right, if the
legislature could find a sufficient social interest in the change. The only
question in these cases should be; is this right protected under the con-
stitution, and if so, is there sufficient social interest for the modification
of such right? This doctrine would be a logical and rational solution of
the problem. It would recognize the rights secured in the Constitution,
but would allow the reasonable modification of such rights where social
interest found it necessary. A. C. J.
CONTRACTS--BREACH DIsTNGuIsHED FRoM REscssioN-The plaintiff,
Rose M. Kirkpatrick, and her husband, John Kirkpatrick, entered into a
written contract with the defendant wherein the defendant agreed to
sell and the Kirkpatricks to buy a certain vacant lot for the agreed price
of $1,774.51, to be paid in printing as demanded from time to time by the
defendant. John Kirkpatrick died after there had been paid in printing,
the sum of $1,072.93. Rose M. Kirkpatrick qualified as administratrix of
his estate and printing services were rendered by the'estate and applied
upon the contract as follows: March 31, 1928, $317.50; May 16, 1928,
$308; August 21, 1928, $76.08. The total amount of the services so ren-
dered was $1,774.51. On April 23, 1928, after the execution of the con-
tract and before the last two payments on the contract were made, the
42 S. Ct. 214; Rich v. Flanders (1859), 39 N. .EL 304; 'Williar v. Baltimore (1876),
45 Md. 546; Lockett -. Usry (1859), 28 Ga. 345; Rhines v. Clarke (1865), 51 Pa.
96; Boat v. Cabbarus County (1910), 151 X. C. 531, 27 S. E. 1066.
6 (1921) 257 U. S. 312.
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RECENT CASE NOTES
defendant conveyed the title to the real estate in question to parties other
than Rose M. Kirkpatrick or her husband, John Kirkpatrick. Whether
Rose M. Kirkpatrick was aware of this conveyance at the time the last
two payments were made is a disputed fact. The defendant never tendered
a deed to the property and never tendered the value of the printing re-
ceived. The plaintiff brought an action for breach of promise. Held, that
by conveying to others before the time for performance of the contract,
the vendor rescinded the contract and discharged the purchaser.1
A contract may be breached in three ways, namely: (1) By one party
renouncing his liabilities under it; (2) by his making its performance
impossible; or (3) by his totally or partially failing to perform his promise.
Breach by renunciation and breach by acts rendering performance im-
possible may take place while the contract is still wholly executory; that
is, before either party is entitled to demand a performance by the other of
his promise. Breach by failure of performance can only take place at or
near the time for performance. 2
The act of the defendant in voluntarily placing it out of his power to
perform the contract constituted a breach thereof, for which the plaintiff
might have brought an action although the time for performance by the
defendant had not yet arrived under the terms of the contract 3 and the
plaintiff's obligation to perform conditions precedent was terminated by
the defendant's breach.4 After the conveyance by the defendant to third
persons, the plaintiff had a right to elect between the following remedies:
(1) To rescind the contract and pursue the remedies based upon such a
rescission. (2) To treat the contract as still binding and wait until the
time for its performance, and at such time to bring an action upon the
contract for breach. (3) To treat the renunciation as an immediate breach
and sue at once for any damages he may have sustained.5 The plaintiff
in this principal case followed the second course of action, suing for dam-
ages for breach of contract and not electing rescission.
When the breach occurs, the party to whom performance is due must
elect whether he will rescind or will demand a continued performance,
and the failure of the adverse party to perform does not, of itself, rescind
the contract.6 The party seeking rescission must be willing and in a
position to perform his part of the agreement. 7  Therefore, if one
party to the contract renders performance impossible, the other party
may, at his election, rescind it.8
From these authorities it would appear that the decision of the court
in the principal case is correct, but not for the reasons given by the court
in its opinion. 0. M. B.
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